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Abstract. ​Attribute-based access control (ABAC) promises a powerful way of formalizing           
access policies in support of a wide range of access management scenarios. Efficient             
implementation of ABAC in its general form is still a challenge, especially when addressing the               
complexity of privacy regulations and access management required to support the explosive            
growth of social and IoT networks. In this paper, we introduce a graph model implementation for                
expressing and evaluating access policies and illustrate a sample use-case implementation over            
Neo4j™ Graph Database. Graph databases excel at querying connected data and hence can             
evaluate complex policies efficiently via graph traversal algorithms. 
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1. Introduction 
In attribute-based access control (ABAC) [1], the level of access to resources are determined              
using attributes defined over the access request including user, resource, environment           
parameters, etc. This model allows for enforcing complex access control policies that involve             
arbitrary combination of attributes with static, dynamic, and relationship-based values, thus           
extending beyond role-based access control (RBAC) [2] and relationship-based access control           
(ReBAC) [3]. 
 
While ABAC allows for high granularity of access policies and hence fits a wide range of access                 
management requirements, implementing ABAC is generally a challenge as it may need more             
time and effort for setup, deployment, and runtime processing. More importantly, the average             
processing time increases with growing policy flexibility and complexity. A variety of            
implementation models have been studied over time; however, they either have been specific to              
a use case, e.g. web services [4,5], or have considered hybrid approaches [6,7] that sacrifice               
the flexibility of “pure” ABAC. One may argue that eXtensible Access Control Markup Language              
(XACML) [8] is the widely-accepted standard model for ABAC; we note, however, that XACML is               
an access control policy language that has support for attributes, hence to be viewed as a                
potential component of an ABAC model. 
 
This paper explores formalizing an ABAC graph model that promises performance of runtime             
processing while allowing for ease of policy administration and maintenance over time. The key              
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 to our graph model implementation is allowing the ABAC primitives, attributes, and policies to              
coexist as part of a single graph structure. In precise words, primitive data parts such as                
subjects, objects, actions as well as their attributes are presented as graph nodes that are               
connected through conceptual relationships. ABAC policies are defined as authorization          
subgraphs that connect to attributes/primitives through condition relationships. This allows          
access management systems to make policy decisions based on well-established and efficient            
graph traversal algorithms. Thanks to the evolution of graph databases, we can implement our              
ABAC graph model without being worried about dealing with relational databases and their             
inherent JOIN operations. We particularly use Neo4j Graph Database [9] for the purpose of              
illustrating our use-case examples. 
 
1.1. Related Work 
A variety of implementation models for ABAC have been studied recently, most of which aim at                
generalizing traditional access control models. Wang et al. introduced a logic-based framework            
for ABAC [10]. Zhang et al. proposed use of attribute enhanced access matrices [11]. More               
recently, Rubio-Medrano et al. [12] put forth use of security tokens and Ferraiolo et al.               
formalized the notion of “policy machine” for ABAC [13]. Jahid et al. [14] developed MyABDAC               
relying on relational database capacities and XACML policy language. The idea of using graph              
implementation for ABAC has been investigated by Santiago et al. [15] and, more recently, by               
Jin and Kaja [16]. Despite similarities, the implementation approaches in [15,16] do not consider              
a unified model to design policy graphs and hence cannot offer universal graph traversal              
algorithms for policy decisions. 
 
1.2. Notations 
We base our notations on Cypher-query language: “Cypher is a declarative graph query             
language that allows for expressive and efficient querying and updating of the graph store” [17].  
 
We use (resp. ) to denote the set of all nodes (resp. relationships) of type . The set  : )( X  : ][ X             X    
denotes the cartesian product of two sets; similarly, means times cartesian: ) : )( X × ( Y          (: )X n  n    
product of with itself. The union of sets and is shown by . Similarly,  : )( X        : )( X  : )( Y    : |Y )( X   
denotes the union of relationship sets and . The notation shows all: |Y ][ X       : ][ X   : ][ Y    : ..n][ Y * m   
paths of length  to  with relationships of type .m n Y  
1.3. Organization 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe a condition-based representation              
of ABAC which helps us introduce our core concepts and our graph model in Section 3. Section                 
4 illustrates an example access scenario and examines our graph model implementation. We             
conclude the work and suggest directions for future work in Section 5. 
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 2. Condition-Based Representation of ABAC 
We consider a representation of Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) where access control            
policies are defined as “Permit” or “Deny” decisions over a set of Condition predicates (or simply                
Conditions). Access control policies are created and managed to restrict access to protected             
objects. An access request contains the following main primitive primitives (or “primitives” for             
short): 
● subject 
● action 
● object 
 
In a simple explanation, an access policy can be presented as (​Permit/Deny: Conditions​),             
implying: 
Permit/Deny ​subject to perform an action on an object if ​Conditions​ hold. 
 
Each condition involves subjects, objects, actions, environment parameters and relationships          
between them. Examples of condition clauses are: 
 
● subject​ belongs to the group “Admin”. 
● object​ is of file type “PDF”. 
● action​ is part of the process “Manage User”. 
● subject​ has “Owner” ​relationship​ with the ​object​. 
 
Note: ​In this paper, we focus on “simple” “monotonic” policies where each policy condition is               
instantiated by either a primitive (e.g., “jsmith”) or an attribute (e.g., “Admin”). In more complex               
ABAC scenarios, policy conditions can be compound and include “disjunction”, “conjunction”,           
and “negation” of other conditions. We also stay with “subject”, “object”, and “action” as our               
query primitives and do not consider other attributes including environmental parameters. In            
“Conclusions and Future work” section, we discuss some challenges of implementing           
compound ABAC and provide examples of how our solution can be expanded.  
 
3. Graph Model Implementation of ABAC 
We describe our model by defining the main concepts and components, followed by introducing              
our universal decision making and policy combining algorithms. 
3.1. Primitive and attribute nodes 
Modeling organizational data into graph can proceed in various ways depending on the use              
cases defined around the data. From the ABAC point of view however, it suffices to distinguish                
between “primitive” elements, i.e., subjects, objects, and actions, and the types of “attributes”             
defined for them. Hence, in our graph model of ABAC we categorize organizational data nodes               
as “primitive” nodes and “attribute” nodes: 
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 ● A “primitive” node is a node in the graph that refers to an individual subject, action, or                 
object. 
● An “attribute” node is a node that describes a primitive node via a direct relationship or                
a chain of attribute-node relationships. 
In our graph model, we use relationship to connect ​primitive nodes with attribute      : AS_ATTR][ H         
nodes and attributes nodes with one another. For example, the Cypher pattern: 
x rimitive) : AS_ATTR] > att1 ttribute) : AS_ATTR] > att2 ttribute)( : P − [ H − ( : A − [ H − ( : A  
shows a chain of attributes for the primitive node .x  
 
Policy and condition nodes 
Each access control policy over graph is realized as a set of paths that represent condition                
clauses. Put differently, we represent a “policy subgraph” with a uniquely identified policy node “              
”, with label , properties including , and a set of conditionolp    olicy: P   ecision Permit, eny}d ∈ { D       
relationships that connect “ ” to condition nodes in the graph. We define the {con }i *i=1   olp     {c }i
*
i=1       
array of possible condition types as  
,T SUB_CON , CT_CON , BJ_CON )C = ( A O  
where 
●  ⇒ representing a subject conditionUB_CONS  
●  ⇒ representing an action conditionCT_CONA  
●  ⇒ representing an object conditionBJ_CONO  
 
This implies that every policy node is connected to the rest of the graph via relationships of type                  
. For a given policy node “ ”, its policy subgraph can be obtained by the CypherTcon i ∈ C       olp           
pattern: 
pol) − : UB_CON |ACT_CON |OBJ_CON ] c)( < [ S − (  
 
A condition node “ ” can be a primitive node or an attribute node that   : rimitive|Attribute)c∈ ( P            
connects to the primitives or their relationships. This allows us to define access control policies               
for specific subjects, actions, objects, as well as their relationships and attributes. 
 
We assume that every policy node has at least one “ ”, one “ ”, and one “          UB_CONS   CT_CONA    
” relationship; otherwise, it is invalid.BJ_CONO  
 
Definition 1 (Valid Policy). ​A policy node “ ” is called ​valid if for all , the Cypher       olp        on Tc ∈ C    
pattern: 
pol) − : on| c)( < [ c − (  
is non-empty. 
 
Note:​ ​For the rest of this paper, we assume all policies are “valid” unless otherwise mentioned. 
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 Furthermore, we treat each policy node as an AND operator for all the connected conditions,               
i.e., all conditions should meet for a policy to match. This is explained formally in Definition 4. 
3.2. Access queries and policy matching 
The main strength of our ABAC graph model is in allowing the Graph to be self contained for                  
authorization queries. That is data and policies sit together in the graph DB and hence one                
universal graph traversal algorithm can be used to find access control decisions. 
 
Generally speaking, the decision query looks for patterns that connect policy nodes to the              
system-given subject, object, and action nodes as “access query” primitives.  
 
Definition 1 (Access Query). ​An Access Query is a triple ,          Q sub, act, obj)A = (   ∈ (: rimitive)P 3  
where 
●  identifies the subject who requests accessubs  
●  identifies the type of access by the subject over the objectcta  
●  identifies the object (resource) that is requested to be accessedbjo  
Each of is called a query primitive.sub, act, obj}{    
 
To determine whether a policy is relevant to an access query, we need to obtain what that policy                  
requires as conditions. 
 
Definition 2 (Required Condition). ​An attribute/primitive node is       : rimitive|Attribute)c∈ ( P   
called a ​required condition of type​ for the policy “ ”, if and only if:on Tc ∈ C ol : olicy)p ∈ ( P  
c) : on] > pol)( − [ c − (  
is non-empty. 
 
Next, it is important to obtain whether the required conditions are satisfied by the access query. 
 
Definition 3 (Satisfied Condition). ​A condition node “ ” is ​satisfied by query primitive “ ” if       c       x   
and only if: 
x) : AS_ATTR ..N ] > c)( − [ H * 0 − (  
is non-empty, where “N” is the “Graph Attribute Depth”, i.e, the maximum length of attribute               
chains. 
 
Now, we can define what a matching policy for a query should look like. 
 
Definition 4 (Matching Policy). A policy node “ ” matches a given access query       olp       
, if and only if each required condition “ ” of type “ ” is satisfied byQ sub, act, obj)A = (           c    T TC i ∈ C     
query primitive . For example, if “ ” is of type “ ”, it should be satisfied  Q Qx = A i ∈ A     c     UB_CONS      
by “ ”.ubs  
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 3.3. Policy combining and decision making 
The last step of policy evaluation is making decisions based on matching policies. It is obvious                
that if all matching policies are of “Permit” effect (i.e., include property), then           ecision ermitd = P   
policy combining will be as simple as the existence a matching policy. However, this is not                
always the case as in certain scenarios, we need to deal with both Permit and Deny matching                 
policies and it becomes crucial to define a procedure for arriving at a decision when there is                 
conflict. Policy combining algorithms play an important role in such situations. 
 
Definition 6 (Policy Combining Algorithm). ​A policy combining algorithm is defined as a         λ      
boolean function that for a given ​access query  Permit, eny}λ : (: rimitive)P 3 × (: olicy)P * → { D        
and a set of matching policies  returns an ​access decision.QA {pol }i *i=1  
 
Common policy combining algorithms include “deny-overrides”, “permit-overrides”,       
“first-applicable”, etc. More interesting examples of such algorithms, when it comes to graph             
traversal, can involve using graph characteristics such as shortest path, policy node properties,             
and policy path weight. 
 
3.4. Universal decision statement  
We have so far provided a graph model implementation of ABAC, which suggests how to create                
policy subgraphs and later how to obtain policy matching and decisions for runtime access              
queries. In this section, we conclude our model by presenting a universal Cypher statement that               
returns the matching policies and the ultimate decision for a query. 
 
Claim 1 (Policy Matching Query). ​The following Cypher statement (where is the graph          N    
policy depth) returns “all” valid matching policies for access query .Q sub, act, obj)A = (    
match​ (sub)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:SUB_CON]->(pol:Policy) 
with​ pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(rc) 
with​ pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
match​ (obj)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:OBJ_CON]->(pol) 
with​ pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(rc) 
with​ pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
match​ (act)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:ACT_CON]->(pol) 
with​ pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(rc) 
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 with​ pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
return​ pol ​as​ matching_policies 
 
Proof in ​Appendix C​. 
 
Note: ​The above query statement assumes that the “subject” node is the starting point to obtain                
policy matching over graph. The starting node however can change to “object” or “action”              
depending on which one leads to a better performance. 
3.5. Policy combining algorithms  
Although Definition 6 suggests independent Cypher statements for policy matching and decision            
making, it is more efficient to obtain an optimized Cypher statement that incorporates our policy               
combining algorithm and returns the ultimate decision for any given access query. Unlike policy              
matching though, providing a general Cypher statement for decision making is challenging and             
depends highly on the type of policy combining. Below, we explain how we can convert the                
policy matching statement of Claim 1 to a decision making statement for a number of combining                
algorithms. 
Deny/Permit-overrides  
The deny-overrides combining algorithm returns “Deny” when at least one of the matching             
policies has . We thus need to change the last line of the statement as (noting  ecision enyd = D               
that lack of matching policy implies a “Deny”): 
return ​case ​when count(pol) = ​0 or ​'Deny' in collect(pol.decision) ​then ​'Deny' ​else             
'Permit'​ ​end​ ​as​ decision 
Similarly, the permit-overrides algorithm returns “Permit” when at least one of the matching             
policies has . The Cypher modification hence looks like:ecision ermitd = P  
return ​case ​when ​'Permit' in collect(pol.decision) ​then ​'Permit' ​else ​'Deny' ​end ​as            
decision 
Max-score 
We define ​max-score ​algorithm as considering the policy node with the maximum            cores  
(assuming policy nodes have an Number-valued property ). Since there can be multiple       cores       
policies with the same , we would need to combine this max-score with other metrics to    cores             
complete our policy combining. For instance, a “​max-score-deny-overrides​” is obtained via the            
following return clause (assuming set is not empty):olp  
with​ max(pol.score) ​as​ max_score, pol ​where​ pol.score = max_score 
return ​case ​when ​'Deny' in collect(pol.decision) ​then ​'Deny' ​else ​'Permit' ​end ​as            
7 
 decision 
 
Shortest-path 
The ABAC graph model implementation allows us to define graph based metrics. One example              
of such a metric is “shortest-path” policy, where a policy length is defined as follows: 
 
Definition 7 (Policy Length). For access query and policy , the policy length is defined       QA    olp       
as the sum of path lengths between  and each primitive .olp Qx∈ A  
 
Although we can add the shortest-path logic to the end of policy matching statement, it will be                 
more efficient to keep track of policy length while finding matching policies. Here is an example                
modification of the statement of Claim 1 to work as a “shortest-path-deny-overrides” algorithm             
(with modified sections show in bold):  
match​ ​path=​(sub)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:SUB_CON]->(pol:Policy) 
with​ pol, ​length(path) ​as​ plen​, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(rc) 
with​ pol, ​plen​, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
match​ ​path=​(obj)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:OBJ_CON]->(pol) 
with​ pol, ​length(path) + plen ​as​ plen​, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(rc) 
with​ pol, ​plen​, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
match​ ​path=​(act)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..N]->(sc)-[:ACT_CON]->(pol) 
with​ pol, ​length(path) + plen ​as​ plen​, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(rc) 
with​ pol, ​plen​, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
 
with​ plen, collect(pol) ​as​ pols ​order by​ plen ​asc​ ​limit​ ​1 
unwind​ pols ​as​ pol 
return ​case ​when count(pol) = ​0 or ​'Deny' in collect(pol.decision) ​then ​'Deny' ​else             
'Permit'​ ​end​ ​as​ decision 
 
 
4. A Sample Implementation Use-Case 
We study a healthcare use-case example which involves patient, nurse, and doctor entities as              
well as digital assets such as patient profile and medical records. Peter is referred, by his family                 
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 doctor, Sue, to a hospital for a few medical exams. John and Joe are working in the hospital as                   
physician and nurse, respectively. The hospital provides digital services to maintain Peter’s            
identity profile and his medical records, including a medical exam report, identified as             
“MR_1234”. 
Implementing sample data in graph 
The following graph presents the above data as a set of connected primitive and attribute               
nodes. 
 
Color legend:  
 
 
Figure 1.​ Neo4j graph presentation of the sample data 
 
While there can be a variety of conceptual relationships between the primitive (subject, object,              
action) primitives and attributes, we use a separate “ ” relationship for those        AS_ATTRH     
connections that are important to our ABAC policy matching. These distinguishable           
relationships help us define ABAC policies by connecting policy nodes to attributes nodes and              
processing runtime access queries by finding graph traversal pattern that connect query            
primitives to policy nodes via “ ” relationships. This relationship type can be viewed     AS_ATTRH         
as part of the existing graph data or an ABAC-deployment graph layer. ​Appendix A shows the                
Cypher query that creates the above graph in Neo4j. 
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 4.1. Sample access policies and graph implementation 
The policies we are considering are: 
● Policy 1. ​The hospital staff have full access to the hospital (patient) profiles. 
● Policy 2.​ The hospital doctors have full access to the hospital records. 
● Policy 3.​ Doctors from Peter’s family clinic can read Peter’s medical records. 
 
As discussed earlier, these policies can be represented, respectively, as 
● Policy 1: ​Permit if 
○ Subject is/has attribute “Hospital Staff” 
○ Action is/has attribute ”Full Access” 
○ Object is/has attribute “Hospital Profiles” 
● Policy 2.​ ​Permit if 
○ Subject is/has attribute “Doctor” 
○ Subject is/has attribute “Hospital Staff” 
○ Action is/has attribute ”Full Access” 
○ Object is/has attribute “Hospital Records” 
● Policy 3.​ ​Permit if 
○ Subject is/has attribute “Doctor” 
○ Subject is/has attribute “Peter’s Family Clinic” 
○ Action is/has attribute ”Read” 
○ Object is/has attribute “Peter’s Medical Records” 
 
Policy 1 is a simple policy example with one condition per query primitive. Policy 2 extends this                 
to a case where we account for multiple conditions of the same type (i.e., subject here). Policy 3                  
extends this further to a relationship-based policy which requires the subject to have a specific               
relation to the object; hence, attribute is a relationship. Figure 2 shows the data together with                
Policies 1, 2, and 3, shown by light blue nodes from top to bottom, respectively. 
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Figure 2.​ Neo4j graph presentation of the sample policies and data 
 
 
Appendix B shows the Cypher query statements which create the three policy subgraphs in              
Neo4j.  
 
4.2. Sample access queries and policy implications 
Example implications of our sample policies include: 
● John can write to Peter’s medical record MD_1234. 
● Sue can read MD_1234. 
● Sue cannot write to MD_1234 record. 
To examine the above, we write the following parameterized version of our “universal policy              
decision query” of Claim 1 with a “deny-overrides” combining algorithm: 
with​ ​{​AQ​}​ ​as​ req 
// Stage 1 - Subject Conditions 
match​ (sub:Subject 
{​name​:​req.SUBJECT_NAME​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..5]->(sc)-[:SUB_CON]->(pol:Policy) 
with​ req, pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(rc) 
with​ req, pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
// Stage 2 - Object Conditions 
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 match​ (obj:Object ​{​name​:​req.OBJECT_NAME​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..5]->(sc)-[:OBJ_CON]->(pol) 
with​ req, pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(rc) 
with​ req, pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons  ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
// Stage 3 - Action Conditions 
match​ (act:Action ​{​name​:​req.ACTION_NAME​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR*0..5]->(sc)-[:ACT_CON]->(pol) 
with​ req, pol, size(collect(​distinct​ sc)) ​as​ sat_cons 
match​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(rc) 
with​ req, pol, sat_cons, size(collect(rc)) ​as​ req_cons ​where​ req_cons = sat_cons 
return​ ​case​ ​when​ count(pol) = ​0​ or ​'Deny'​ in collect(pol.decision) ​then​ ​'Deny'​ ​else 
'Permit'​ ​end​ ​as​ decision 
 
where ​AQ​ refers to an access query from the following parameters object: 
:params ​{​ ​"JohnWriteMR_1234"​:​ { ​"SUBJECT_NAME"​:​ ​"John"​,​ ​"OBJECT_NAME"​:​ ​"MR_1234"​, 
"ACTION_NAME"​:​ ​"Write"​ ​}​, ​"SueReadMR_1234"​: ​{​ ​"SUBJECT_NAME"​:​ ​"Sue"​,​ ​"OBJECT_NAME"​: 
"MR_1234"​,​ ​"ACTION_NAME"​:​ ​"Read"​ ​}​, ​"SueWriteMR_1234"​: ​{​ ​"SUBJECT_NAME"​:​ ​"Sue"​, 
"OBJECT_NAME"​:​ ​"MR_1234"​,​ ​"ACTION_NAME"​:​ ​"Write"​ ​}​ } 
 
Running the Cypher with the three access queries, we will obtain: 
● JohnWriteMR_1234 ⇒ ​Permit  
● SueReadMR_1234 ⇒ ​Permit 
● SueWriteMR_1234 ⇒ ​Deny  
which matches our expectation. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this paper, we introduced a graph model to represent ABAC policies and provided a universal                
Cypher policy decision statement that decides about access queries by traversing the paths             
between query primitives and policy nodes. For the sake of simplicity, we assumed: 
● Policies don’t have negative or multi-level conditions. 
● Attributes are defined only for “subjects”, “objects”, and “actions” primitives. 
 
In this section, we provide some directions to expand our graph model to support compound               
policies as well as extended attributes. We leave a more detailed analysis of this to future work. 
 
5.1. Compound conditions/policies 
ABAC generally allows for “compound” policies, where each policy condition can be a nested              
combination of other conditions in the form of disjunction (OR), conjunction (AND), and negation              
(NOT) logics. Firstly, we note that even the simple policy graph model allows for one-level               
compound logic, i.e., 
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 ● Logical disjunction is achieved as each policy subgraph is independently created and we             
match “any” policy against a given query primitive. 
● Logical conjunction is implicitly supported as each policy node is of a conjunctive (AND)              
operation nature. We thus can connect multiple conditions of a type to a policy node. 
● Logical negation is supported at the policy node level through the node property             
.ecision Permit, eny}d ∈ { D  
 
This implies that our simple policy model is “complete” in the sense that any set of policies in                  
any access management scenario can be written in the simple policy model. However, it is               
reasonable to assume that some access management scenarios desire managing more           
complex policies. 
Non-monotonic policies and negation nodes. 
Non-monotonic policies depend on conditions which require “lack” of an attribute for a             
subject/object/action primitive. An example policy is: 
“Any Employee whose account is NOT suspended can browse through company portal.” 
 
The above statement can be presented by a “ ” policy node with the following        ecision ermitd = P       
conditions: 
● subject (is/has attribute) Employee, and  
● subject (does NOT have attribute) Suspended, and  
● action is (is/has attribute) Browse, and  
● object is (is/has attribute) Company Portal. 
 
Our simple graph model can support the above policy if is broken down (for example) to the                 
following two simple policies and apply the “deny-overrides” combining algorithm: 
● Policy 1:​ Permit if  
○ subject (is/has attribute) Employee, and  
○ action is (is/has attribute) Browse, and  
○ object is (is/has attribute) Company Portal. 
● Policy 2:​ Deny if  
○ subject (is/has attribute) Suspended, and  
○ action is (is/has attribute) Browse, and  
○ object is (is/has attribute) Company Portal. 
 
We can also expand our graph model to deal with negation in condition via explicit negation                
nodes that connect policy nodes to condition nodes, like: 
.c) : on] > n OT ) : on] > pol)( − [ c − ( : N − [ c − (  
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 Here is an example of a subject condition graph: 
 
 
Figure 3.​ Negated subject condition 
 
Lack of attribute for a primitive can be presented over graph as non-existence of a path between                 
the attribute node and the primitive node. To support negation conditions within the universal              
decision query, the Cypher pattern between a negation condition node and a query primitive          c      
 should return “null” if  is required by the policy node.Qx∈ A c  
 
Multi-level conditions and conjunction/disjunction nodes. 
An example of a multi-level condition policy is: 
“Any Manager or Senior Employee can View Monthly Reports.” 
 
For our simple policy model to implement the above policy statement, we would need to break it 
down to two policy subgraphs as follows: 
● Policy 1:​ Permit if  
○ subject (is/has attribute) Manager, and 
○ action is (is/has attribute) View, and  
○ object is (is/has attribute) Monthly Reports. 
● Policy 2:​ Permit if  
○ subject (is/has attribute) Employee, and 
○ subject (is/has attribute) Senior, and  
○ action is (is/has attribute) View, and  
○ object is (is/has attribute) Monthly Reports. 
 
Although the above may look cumbersome for the above statement, staying with simple policy              
model and avoiding multi-level conditions may be a good practice from a performance point of               
view. If needed, however, to deal with multi-level policies in graph, we can use              
conjunction/disjunction nodes that combine other conditions. Figure 4 illustrates a multi-level           
condition policy subgraph for the original policy: 
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Figure 4.​ Policy with multi-level compound subject condition 
 
Extended attributes - session and environment 
In this paper, we considered attributes only for “subjects”, “objects”, and “actions”. In generic              
ABAC, more primitives can be involved. We can extend “subject” to “session”, i.e., which              
represents the requester of a runtime access and includes more than only subject: 
● Subject 
● Location 
● Client Type 
● Context (AuthN level/type, Creds, etc) 
 
For example, a “session” can reveal that the request is from: 
“jsmith” with “iPhoneX App” in “Chicago” where “2-factor AuthN” is established 
 
Furthermore, ABAC can involve environmental attributes, which describe environment         
parameters such as current time, current temperature, etc. We note that our graph model can               
easily be extended to support attributes for session and environment primitives. While static             
information, e.g., location, time range, IP range, can be a good fit for the graph model, it is                  
recommended to not to use graph for dynamic environmental primitives such as time, IP, etc. 
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 7. Appendix 
Appendix A - Cypher to create sample data 
 
//Patient 
create​ (peter:Subject:User:Primitive 
{​name​:​'Peter'​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(patient:Role:Attribute ​{​name​:​'Patient'​}​) 
 
//Doctor & Nurses 
create​ (joe:Subject:User:Primitive ​{​name​:​"Joe"​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(nurse:Role:Attribute 
{​name​:​'Nurse'​}​) 
create​ (john:Subject:User:Primitive 
{​name​:​'John'​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(doctor:Role:Attribute ​{​name​:​'Doctor'​}​) 
merge​ (john)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(staff:Group:Attribute ​{​name​:​'Hospital 
Staff'​}​)<-[:HAS_ATTR]-(joe) 
merge​ (sue:Subject:User:Primitive ​{​name​:​"Sue"​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(doctor) 
merge​ (sue)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(pClinic:Relationship:Attribute ​{​name​:​ ​"Peter's Family 
Clinic"​}​) 
 
// Peter's digital assets 
merge​ (peter)-[:OWNER_OF]->(pRecs:Group:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Peter's Medical 
Records"​}​)<-[:HAS_ATTR]-(rec:Record:Object:Primitive ​{​name​:​"MR_1234"​}​) 
merge​ (pRecs)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(hRecs:Group:Attribute ​{​name​:​'Hospital Records'​}​) 
merge​ (peter)-[:OWNER_OF]->(prof:Data:Object ​{​name​:​"Peter's 
Profile"​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(pp:Group:Attribute ​{​name​:​'Hospital Profiles'​}​) 
 
// Actions 
merge​ (read:Action ​{​name​:​'Read'​}​)-[:HAS_ATTR]->(fullAccess:Attribute:Group 
{​name​:​"Full Access"​}​)<-[:HAS_ATTR]-(write:Action ​{​name​:​'Write'​}​); 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B - Cypher queries to create policies  
 
// Policy 1 - Permit: Hospital Staff, Full Access, Patient Profile 
18 
 match​ (sub:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Hospital Staff"​}​), (obj:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Hospital 
Profiles"​}​), (act:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Full Access"​}​) 
create​ (pol:Policy ​{​name​:​'Policy1'​,​ decision​:​"Permit"​}​) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(sub) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(obj) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(act); 
 
// Policy 2 - Permit: Doctor & Hospital Staff, Full Access, Hospital Records 
match​ (sub1:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Hospital Staff"​}​), (sub2:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Doctor"​}​), 
(obj:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Hospital Records"​}​), (act:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Full Access"​}​) 
create​ (pol:Policy ​{​name​:​'Policy2'​,​ decision​:​"Permit"​}​) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(sub1) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(sub2) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(obj) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(act); 
 
// Policy 3 - Permit: Doctor & Peter's Family Clinic, Read, Peter's Medical Records 
match​ (sub1:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Peter's Family Clinic"​}​), (sub2:Attribute 
{​name​:​"Doctor"​}​), (obj:Attribute ​{​name​:​"Peter's Medical Records"​}​), (act:Action 
{​name​:​"Read"​}​) 
create​ (pol:Policy ​{​name​:​'Policy3'​,​ decision​:​"Permit"​}​) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(sub1) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:SUB_CON]-(sub2) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:OBJ_CON]-(obj) 
merge​ (pol)<-[:ACT_CON]-(act); 
 
Appendix C. Proof of Claim 1 
We need to show: 
A. For each returned policy, all its required conditions are satisfied by .QA  
B. Any policy whose required conditions are all satisfied by  is returned.QA  
Let us prove (A) first. Assume is a returned policy by the above statement. We show that all      olp              
required conditions of of type are satisfied (similar argument holds for other   olp    UB_CONS         
condition types). Assume that there is a required condition that is NOT satisfied by query         c        
primitive . This would mean (via Definition 3)ubs  
sub) : AS_ATTR ..5] > c)( − [ H * 0 − (  
is empty. Comparing the first two lines of the Cypher statement, we would have: 
● Size of is at most equal to the size of  ( )cs cr ize(sat_con) ize(req_con)s ≤ s  
● Node  is part of but not part of .c cr cs   
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 This would imply which violates the Cypher condition clause,   ize(sat_con) ize(req_con)s < s       
leaving “ ” out of the returned policies; hence, proven by “​contradiction​”.olp  
 
We now prove (B). Assume is a matching policy for . All required conditions of     olp      olp   QA     cr   
of type are satisfied by , implyingolp UB_CONS ubs  
sub) : AS_ATTR ..5] > c) : UB_CON ] > pol)( − [ H * 0 − ( − [ S − (  
holds for all in , meaning is a subset of . On the other than, the first two lines of the   c  cr   cr     cs            
statement suggests that is a subset of . This together proves the equality   cs     cr      
; hence survives the subject condition check. Similarly, we canize(sat_con) ize(req_con)s = s   olp         
show that survives other condition checks and hence is returned by the Cypher statement.olp  
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